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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court announced a broad
exception to the federal exclusionary rule' in United States v. Leon.2
The Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable when police officers
obtain evidence in reasonable, good faith reliance on a warrant later

found to be defective.3

Commentators had advised against the

creation of the so-called good faith exception before Leon.4 After Leon,

they promulgated a torrent of commentary criticizing both the Leon
Court's reasoning and its result. 5

Today, because Leon does not

1. First announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the exclusionary rule
requires courts to suppress evidence that police obtain in violation of a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. The Court applied the rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
3.
Id. at 913.
4.
See, for example, Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to
Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611; Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary
Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis"Rather Than an "EmpiricalProposition"?,16 Creighton L. Rev.
565 (1983); William J. Mertens and Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulatingthe Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Georgetown L. J. 365
(1981).
5.
See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3 (West, 2d ed. 1987);
Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work": The Exclusionary Rule After Leon,
1984 S. Ct. Rev. 309; Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale L. J. 906 (1986); Steven Duke,
Making Leon Worse, 95 Yale L. J. 1405 (1986); Wayne R. LaFave, "The Seductive Call of
Expediency". United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 895;
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control state constitutional decisions, 6 the battle over the good faith
exception is fought on the state level.
Currently, the highest courts of eight states have rejected the
Leon exception on state constitutional grounds, 7 representing one of
the latest accomplishments of the new federalism movement.8 In
contrast, the highest courts of eleven states have adopted the Leon
good faith exception under their state constitutions.9 In addition, four
states have adopted statutory good faith exceptions. 10 The highest

Silas J. Wasserstrom and William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It
a FairTrial?,22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85 (1984).
6.
State courts may grant state citizens greater constitutional rights under their
respective state constitutions than the United States Constitution requires. PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). To insulate their decisions from Supreme Court review,
state courts must base their decisions on adequate and independent state grounds. Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-38 (1983).
7.
State v. Marsala,216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58, 59 (1990); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho
981, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (1992); State v. Novtembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987); State v.
Gutierrez,863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (N.M. 1993); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458
(1985); State v. Carter,322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526
Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 905-06 (1991); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d 119, 121 (1991). In
addition, Georgia has rejected Leon on statutory grounds. Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 422 S.E.2d
426, 428 (1992).
8.
New federalism is a movement advocating state independence in constitutional
decisionmaking. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895 n.6; James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of
State Constitutionalism,90 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 762 (1992).
9.
See Lincoln v. State, 285 Ark. 107, 685 S.W.2d 166, 167 (1985); People v. Camarella,286
Cal. Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63, 64-65 (1991) (asserting that California adopted the Leon exception by
virtue of California Constitution, Art. I, § 28(d), which eliminated a judicially created remedy for
violations of the federal and state search and seizure provisions, except to the extent that
exclusion remains federally compelled); Bernie v. State, 524 S.2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1988) (explaining
that Florida adopted the Leon good faith exception by virtue of a 1982 amendment to the Florida
Constitution providing that the state search and seizure provision must be construed in
conformity with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment);
Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 688-89 (Ky. 1992); Connelly v. State 322 Md. 719, 589
A.2d 958,966-67 (1991); State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 425 n.4, 426 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); State
v. Kleinberg, 228 Neb. 128, 421 N.W.2d 450, 454-55 (1988); State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St. 3d 251,
490 N.E.2d 1236, 1248 (1986); McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (1984);
State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825, 828 (S.D. 1988); Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 380 (Wyo. 1989)
(recognizing the good faith exception in dicta). Most courts that have adopted the Leon exception
have done so with little or no analysis of their state constitutions. The District of Columbia
likewise appears to have adopted the Leon good faith exception. See Lumpkin v. United States,
586 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C. App. 1991).
10. The Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, and Indiana legislatures have adopted statutory good
faith exceptions. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3925 (West 1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-308
(West 1990); nM. Ann. Stat ch. 725, § 5/114-12 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-37-4-5
(Michie 1994). In addition, the Texas legislature adopted a modified good faith exception. Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(b) creates an exception to the state exclusionary rule for
evidence obtained by the police acting in objective, good faith reliance on a warrant issued by a
magistrate based on probable cause. See Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 912-13 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990) (explaining that the statute is not a codification of Leon).
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courts in twenty-six states have not decided yet whether to
incorporate a good faith exception under their state constitutions.11
After setting forth the reasoning behind the Leon decision in
Part II, this Note catalogues the criticisms of Leon in Part III, demonstrating that a number of compelling reasons militate in favor of state
court rejection of Leon. Given this impetus for state courts to reject
Leon, Part IV of this Note explores the debate among new federalism
commentators regarding the proper grounds for state court divergence

11.
The highest courts in Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montna, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin have not decided yet whether to adopt Leon. See Mason v. State,
534 A.2d 242, 254 (Del. 1987) (discussing Leon, but finding the good faith exception inapplicable);
State v. Rothman, 70 Haw. 546, 779 P.2d 1, 8 (1989) (asserting that the court had not adopted the
Leon exception yet); State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Black Hawk County, 472 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa
1991) (stating that the court had not adopted the Leon exception yet); State v. Probst, 247 Kan.
196, 795 P.2d 393, 401 (1990) (discussing Leon but finding the good faith exception inapplicable);
Commonwealth v. Pellegrini,405 Mass. 86, 539 N.E.2d 514, 517 n.6 (1989) (asserting that it had
not adopted the Leon exception under state law); People v. Jackson, 180 Mich. App. 339, 446
N.W.2d 891, 894 (1989) (finding that other Michigan courts of appeals had declined to follow
Leon); State v. Veglia, 620 A.2d 276, 278 n.3 (Me. 1993) (stating that it had neither accepted nor
rejected the Leon good faith exception); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 n.2 (Minn. 1985)
(explaining that the court did not need to consider Leon because it found that the warrant was
supported by probable cause); Stringer v. State, 491 S.2d 837, 841 (Miss. 1986) (Roberston, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the court for its failure to address Leon); Point v. State, 102 Nev. 143, 717
P.2d 38, 42-43 (1986) (discussing Leon but finding it inapplicable); State v. Dymowski, 458 N.W.2d
490, 499 n.2 (N.D. 1990) (declining to address the good faith exception); State v. Tanner, 304 Or.
312, 745 P.2d 757, 758 (1987) (discussing Leon without explicitly rejecting or accepting the good
faith exception); State v. Taylor, 621 A.2d 1252, 1255-56 (R.I. 1993) (discussing the Leon exception
but finding it inapplicable); State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 352 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1987)
(explaining that even if the court adopted a good faith exception, it would be inapplicable); Sims v.
CollectionDiv. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 11 n.10 (Utah 1992) (noting that the court
had not decided whether to adopt the good faith exception); State v. Crawley, 61 Wash. App. 29,
808 P.2d 773, 776 (1991) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court had not adopted the Leon
exception yet); State v. Adkins, 176 W. Va. 613, 346 S.E.2d 762, 775 n.20 (1986) (asserting that it
would not address Leon because the exception was inapplicable); State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis.
2d 978, 471 N.W.2d 24,28-29 (1991) (holding the Leon exception inapplicable).
Lower courts in five of these states, however, have applied the Leon good faith exception. See
Colvette v. State, 568 S.2d 319, 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Sidel, 16 Kan. App. 2d 686, 827
P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); State v. Williams, 608 S.2d 266, 272-73 (La. App. 1992); State v. Tarantino,
587 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Me. 1992) (noting that the lower court had applied the good faith exception,
but deciding the case on different grounds); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991)
(noting that the lower court had applied the good faith exception to the case but finding the
exception inapplicable).
Four of the twenty-six courts that have not decided whether to adopt the Leon good faith
exception appear likely to reject Leon. See People v. Bloyd, 416 Mich. 538, 331 N.W.2d 447 (1982)
(rejecting a good faith exception under its state constitution prior to Leon); State v. Van Haele,
199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d 1311, 1315 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Long, 700 P.2d
153 (Mont. 1985) (rejecting a good faith exception under its state constitution before Leon); State
v. Tanner,304 Or. 312, 745 P.2d 757, 758 n.2 (1987) (stating that it viewed the state exclusionary
rule as a constitutional right, not a remedy); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061, 1069
n.6 (1982) (rejecting a good faith arrest exception under its state constitution prior to Leon
because it found the good faith standard unworkable).
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from Supreme Court precedent. It then concludes that most new
federalism commentators agree that reactive rulings-those based
solely on their dissatisfaction with Supreme Court reasoning and
result'2-are improper. Instead, commentators suggest a statespecific factor to support divergence. Part V then analyzes the eight
decisions rejecting Leon on state constitutional grounds, finding that
the majority of these decisions are reactive. Part VI defends these
reactive decisions by demonstrating that the new federalism
commentators' condemnation of reactive rulings is unjustified.
Finally, this Note urges the remaining state courts to reject Leon's
good faith exception under their state constitutions, regardless of
whether state-specific factors support divergence.
II. THE LEON DECISION
The facts of Leon are straightforward and particularly favorable to support a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In
Leon, the police initiated a drug-trafficking investigation, relying on
an informant's tip. 1 Based on an affidavit describing police observa-

tions and the tip, a state court judge issued a search warrant for the
suspects' residences and automobiles. 14 During the ensuing search,
police discovered large quantities of narcotics. 15 The district court
suppressed the evidence because it found that the affidavit did not
establish probable cause. 6 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit declined the government's invitation to recognize a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule and upheld the suppression. 7 The Supreme
Court reversed in a six-to-three decision, modifying the federal exclusionary rule so that it does not bar evidence seized by police officers in

12. Gardner, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 772 (cited in note 8).
13. Leon, 468 U.S. at 901.
14. Id. at 902.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 903.
17. Id. at 904. In determining that the ffidavit in Leon did not establish probable cause,
the Ninth Circuit used the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelliprobable cause test. Id. at 904. Between
the time that the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court decided Leon, however, the Court
abandoned the Aguilar-Spinellitest. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court adopted a
less stringent totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Id. at 238. Arguably, the Court should have
remanded Leon to the Ninth Circuit to consider the Gates holding or it should have reconsidered
the affidavit itself. Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 98 (cited in note 5). It
likely would have found the affidavit sufficient under the new probable cause standard. Id. The
Court's failure to remand the case or to reconsider the sufficiency of the affidavit demonstrates
"how precipitate the unnecessary holding of Leon really was." LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure §
1.3(c) at 53 (cited in note 5).
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reasonable, good faith reliance on a subsequently invalidated
warrant.'
The Leon Court first asserted that the exclusionary rule was
not a "necessary corollary" to the Fourth Amendment, despite
precedent that suggested otherwise.' 9 Rather, the Court explained
that the exclusionary rule functions as a judicially created remedy
that safeguards Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent
effect. 20 The Court justified its conclusion in two ways. First, it noted
2
that the Fourth Amendment does not expressly provide for the rule. '
Second, it reasoned that the use of illegally seized evidence does not
constitute a new Fourth Amendment violation.22
The Court then explained that it would determine whether
exclusion is appropriate in a case in which the police reasonably relied
on a subsequently invalidated warrant by weighing the costs and
benefits of exclusion.23 The Court identified the "substantial social
costs" of the exclusionary rule on the criminal justice system's truthfinding function 24 and its collateral consequences, the nonconviction
and nonprosecution of guilty defendants.25 Although the Court
acknowledged that empirical studies demonstrated that the rule's
impact was insubstantial, 26 it reasoned that the studies' findings,
stated in terms of overall percentages, actually masked large numbers
of guilty defendants who are released because of the suppression of
27
evidence.
The Court defined the benefits of the exclusionary rule solely in
terms of the rule's deterrent effect on police officers.28 The Court
discounted the rule's effect on issuing judges and magistrates for three
reasons. First, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule was
18. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
19. Id. at 905-06 (referring to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 655-57 (1961), and Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928)).
20. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
21.
Id. See U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
22. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. In asserting that a court's admission of illegally seized evidence
works no new Fourth Amendment violation, the Court read the Amendment to restrain the police
but not the courts. See note 58 and accompanying text.
23. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07. The Court bolstered its assertion that the exclusionary rule's
application properly depends on a cost-benefit analysis of exclusion by explaining, "As with any
remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 908 (quoting United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338,348 (1974)).

24.
25.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
Id.

26. Id. at 908 n.6 (referring primarily to Davies, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. at 621 (cited
in note 4)).
27. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 n.6.

28.

See id. at 918.
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promulgated to deter police misconduct rather than to penalize judges
and magistrates for their mistakes.29 Second, the Court stated that it
had no evidence before it indicating that issuing judges and magistrates abused the principles of the Fourth Amendment0 Third, it
doubted that the threat of suppression could have any deterrent effect
on judges and magistrates because of their role as neutral and
detached judicial officers who- have no stake in the outcomes of
criminal prosecutions. 31
In contrast to its costs, the Court found that when officers
reasonably relied on subsequently invalidated warrants, the benefits
of the exclusionary rule were "marginal to nonexistent."32 Although

the Court acknowledged that applying the exclusionary rule in these
cases might deter future inadequate presentations or magistrate
shopping, it dismissed these possibilities as speculative. 33 The Court
also asserted that when the police reasonably rely on warrants, no
police illegality exists.34 Therefore, the Court reasoned, suppression in
these cases logically could not have a deterrent effect on police.3 1
The Leon majority concluded that the substantial social costs of
exclusion outweighed its marginal to nonexistent benefits when police
officers rely on subsequently invalidated warrants. 36 Therefore, it
approved the good faith exception. The Court stressed, however, that
exclusion would be improper only if the officer's reliance on the
warrant was objectively reasonableY.3

III. CRITICISMS OF LEON
Criticisms of Leon fall into three primary categories, each
directed at a different level of the Leon Court's analysis. The first
29.

Id. at 916.

30.

Id.

31.
32.

Id. at 916-17.
Id. at 922.

33.

Id. at 918.

34. Id. at 920-21.
35. Id. at 921.
36. Id. at 922.
37. The Court noted that inquiring into the officer's subjective state of mind would result in
a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources." Id. at 922 n.23 (quoting Masaachu.etts
v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). The Court enumerated four
situations in which an officer's reliance would not be objectively reasonable: (1) when the affiant
knowingly or recklessly falsified the warrant application, (2) when the issuing magistrate
abandoned his neutral and detached role, (3) when the affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," and (4) when the
warrant was facially deficient. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois,422 U.S. 590, 61011 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
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category disagrees with the Leon Court's classification of the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy rather than a constitutional right.38 The second criticism argues that even if the rule is a
mere remedy, the application of which depends on a balancing test,
the Leon Court's cost-benefit analysis was flawed in many respects. 39
The third category of criticisms concerns the unsettling consequences
of the Leon decision. 40
A. The ConstitutionalRight to Exclusion
In the course of the exclusionary rule's history, 41 the Supreme
Court has perceived the rule as resting on two different conceptual
bases-a substantive constitutional right and a judicially created remedy. 42 Furthermore, it offered three purposes for the exclusionary
rule:
(1) to vindicate victims of unconstitutional searches and
seizures, (2) to deter police misconduct, and (3) to preserve the
integrity of the judiciary.43 The Court's perception of the rule's bases

38. See, for example, Leon, 468 U.S. at 931-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaFave, 1 Search
and Seizure § 1.3(b) at 49-51 (cited in note 5).
39. See, for example, Leon, 468 U.S. at 948-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaFave, 1 Search
and Seizure §§ 1.3(c) & (d) at 51-59 (cited in note 5); Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. at 102-17 (cited in note 5).
40. One commentator argues that neither of the first two criticisms of Leon are ultimately
persuasive. Dripps, 95 Yale L. J. at 906 (cited in note 5). Dripps contends that the categorical

objection to the Court's denial of the constitutional right to exclusion rests on a mistaken

interpretation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 906-07. The purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, he asserts, is the protection of lawful privacy. As such, the Fourth Amendment
must be read to condemn only the illegal search, not the admission of evidence, because admission
does not itself invade the privacy of the search victim. Id. at 918-22. Dripps rejects the analytical
objection to the Leon majority's cost-benefit analysis for its failure to consider the costs of the
warrant process that, he estimates, probably surpass exclusion as disincentive for abusive
warrants. Id. at 907. Because of the costs of the warrant process, he concludes, Leon is unlikely
to encourage speculative search warrants. Id. at 923-33. Although he rejects both the categorical
and analytical criticisms of Leon, Dripps objects to the decision from a jurisprudential standpoint.
He asserts that Leon removes the exclusionary sanction from an entire category of Fourth
Amendment violations. Id. at 933-39.
41.
For a thorough discussion of the history and development of the exclusionary rule, see
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colun. L. Rev. 1365 (1983); Mertens and
Wasserstrom, 70 Georgetown L. J. at 373-89 (cited in note 4).
42. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 931-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's waffing as to
the exclusionary rule's basis and arguing that the rule is a constitutional right rather than a
judicially created remedy).
43. See Timothy R. Lohraff, Note, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for
State Courts to Develop State ConstitutionalLaw, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 311, 323 & n.70 (noting that
both the Court and commentators have mentioned these factors as purposes behind the
exclusionary rule).
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and purposes has important analytical consequences. Together, they
determine the Court's application of the rule. 44
When the Court first articulated the exclusionary rule in Weeks
v. United States,45 it characterized the rule as a constitutional right.
The Weeks Court clearly stated that the prosecution's use of the
illegally seized evidence denied the defendant his constitutional
rights. 46 The Court justified its view of the rule by relying on the
judicial integrity rationale for the rule, explaining that courts must
not sanction unlawful searches and seizures.4 7 In Weeks's progeny,
furthermore, the Court adhered to the view that the exclusionary rule
rested on a constitutional foundation. 48
In United States v. Calandra,49 however, the Court divorced the
exclusionary rule from its constitutional foundation and introduced
deterrence as the preeminent purpose of the rule. Calandrastated
that the rule was a judicially created remedy promulgated to protect
Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect, rather than an
individual right of the aggrieved party. 5° The Court then explained
the significance of the rule's demotion from right to remedy: As with
any remedy, the rule's application was limited to those cases in which
its purposes would be served most effectively. 51 As a remedy, the
rule's application was not automatic but contingent on a balancing of
the costs and the benefits of exclusion. Accordingly, Calandra
narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule considerably.
Calandra's demotion of the exclusionary rule from right to
remedy and its assertion that the only purpose behind the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police misconduct justified incursions on
the exclusionary rule. After Calandra, the Court continually narrowed the rule's application. For example, it has held illegally seized
evidence admissible: (1) in grand jury proceedings,52- (2) to impeach
the defendant's testimony during his criminal trial,5 (3) in federal civil
tax proceedings when the illegal search was conducted by state
44. See LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.1(f) at 17-18 (cited in note 5) (explaining that the
Court's view of the exclusionary rule's purposes has determined the rule's scope and that in
recent years, the Court has relied exclusively on the deterrence rationale for the rule).
45. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
46. Id. at 398.
47. Id. at 392.
48. See, for example, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary
rule is "an essential part of both the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments").
49. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
50. Id. at 348.
51. Id. (stating that "[als with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served").
52. Id. at 349.
53. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,627-28 (1980).
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officials.4 and (4) in the trials of defendants who are the targets, but
55
not the victims, of illegal searches.
Following Calandra'slead, the Leon Court cast the rule as a
remedy applicable only when its deterrent function is served most
effectively.5 The Leon Court thereby further restricted the exclusionary rule's application by creating the good faith exception. As the
dissenters argued, however, the Leon Court's classification of the
exclusionary rule as a remedy rather than a right rested on a very
narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment. 57 First, it hardly follows
from the Fourth Amendment's lack of reference to the exclusionary
rule that the rule has no constitutional foundation. Much of our constitutional doctrine is the product of judicial implication.5
Second, the Leon Court read the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting police from executing illegal searches and seizures but allowing
courts to admit illegally obtained evidence. 59 The dissent, however,
argued that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, like other guarantees in the Bill of Rights,
should be read to constrain the government as a whole. ° The dissenters suggested that the artificial line drawn by the Leon Court between
the constitutional responsibilities of the police and the courts
denigrates the integrity of the judiciary.61 The dissenters explained

54.
United States v. Janis,428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
55.
United States v. Payner,447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980).
56. See note 20 and accompanying text.
57. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 931-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 932; Kamisar, 16 Creighton L. Rev. at 581-83 (cited in note 4) (citing examples
such as the rule barring involuntary confessions).
59. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. Courts may view the government's role in a criminal prosecution
in two different ways. The fragmentary model and the unitary model, developed by Professors
Schrock and Welsh, represent the differing views of the government's role in a criminal prosecution and explicate a discussion of the constitutional foundations of the exclusionary rule. See
Thomas S. Schrock and Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251 (1974). The unitary model considers the police's
illegal search or seizure and the court's subsequent admission of the resulting evidence as a single
transaction prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 298. Under this paradigm, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits not only illegal searches and seizures but also the admission of tainted
evidence. Id. at 299. Therefore, the exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated. In contrast,
the fragmentary model severs the illegal police conduct from the judiciary's admission of tainted
evidence. Id. at 255. The unconstitutionality ends with the illegal seizure under this view;
therefore, courts can admit the fruits without violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 256. The
Fourth Amendment restrains only the police, not the judiciary, under this view. Thus, the
exclusionary rule is a judge-made remedy to deter police misconduct. By reading the Amendment
as restraining police but not courts, the Leon Court necessarily adopted the fragmentary model of
government.
60. Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61.
See id. at 935-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 976-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that by admitting illegally seized evidence, courts condone Fourth
Amendment violations.62
Furthermore, as Justice Brennan argued, the majority's
Fourth Amendment interpretation ignores the fact that the police
seize evidence primarily to be used in criminal prosecutions.6 3 When
this evidentiary link is acknowledged, courts should read the Fourth
Amendment to prohibit not only illegal police activity but also the
court's admission of this evidence.6 4 Therefore, although the Leon
Court considered the exclusionary rule as a remedy to be used as a
deterrent, it based its classification of the rule as a remedy rather
than a right on a very narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against searches and seizures.
B. Balancingto a PredeterminedResult
The Leon Court incorrectly assessed both the costs and the
benefits of the exclusionary rule by overstating the rule's costs and
understating its benefits.65 The
Court's
assertion
that
the
exclusionary rule's costs were substantial66 contradicted the available
empirical data. As Professor LaFave concluded, current assessments

62. Id. As the dissenters' discussions make clear, many of the Court's earlier cases
espoused the judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule. See, for example, Weeks, 232
U.S. at 391-92 (asserting that violations of the Fourth Amendment "should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to
which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights"); id. at 393-94 (declaring that "to sanction [ilegal searches and seizures] would be to affirm
by judicial decision manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-24 (1960) (referring to the "imperative of
judicial integrity" and warning that courts must not become "accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold").
63. Leon, 468 U.S. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393 (noting that law enforcement executes searches and seizures to bring
"proof to the aid of the Government"). See generally Schrock and Welsh, 59 Minn. L. Rev. at 289307 (cited in note 59).
64. Leon, 428 U.S. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explained:
Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence
generally has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial supervised by a
judge, it is apparent that the admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same
constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of that evidence.... Once that connection
between the evidence-gathering role of the police and the evidence-admitting function of
the courts is acknowledged, the plausibility of the Court's interpretation becomes more
suspect.
Id. He concluded, 'The Amendment therefore must be read to condemn not only the initial
unconstitutional invasion of privacy-which is done, after all, for the purpose of securing
evidence-but also the subsequent use of any evidence so obtained." Id. at 934.
65. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3 at 51-59 (cited in note 5).
See generally
Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 102-17 (cited in note 5).
66. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
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of available empirical data reveal that the rule's effect on criminal
prosecutions is minimal.
Even if the Court's cost assessment had reflected the available
data accurately, however, the results still would have been exaggerated because of errors in the Court's analysis. First, the Court
measured the costs attributable to exclusion in all cases. The only
costs at issue in Leon, however, were those that would have been
alleviated by the proposed modification to the exclusionary rule.
Therefore, to gauge the costs of the exclusionary rule accurately, the
Court should have measured the costs only in cases in which the police
made objectively reasonable mistakes.68
Second, the Court's cost assessment did not consider the impact
of Illinois v. Gates69 Decided one year before Leon, Gates replaced the
Aguilar-Spinelliprobable cause test 70 with a more relaxed totality-ofthe-circumstances standard.7 1 Because Gates made suppression of
evidence seized under a warrant less likely than under the AguilarSpinelli probable cause test, it reduced the already minimal costs of
72
the rule.
Moreover, the Court's cost assessment is fundamentally flawed.
Although the majority repeatedly referred to the costs of the
exclusionary rule, attributing those costs to the Fourth Amendment
may have been more accurate.7 3

The Amendment, not the rule,

imposes limitations on the government's ability to secure evidence
and, accordingly, demands the suppression of illegally obtained
evidence .74
67. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(c) at 52 (cited in note 5) (citing Davies, 1983 Am.
Bar Found. Res. J. at 622 (cited in note 4)). See also Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the
ExclusionaryRule: An EmpiricalAssessment, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 585, 606 (reaffirming
that the exclusion of evidence has a truly marginal effect on the criminal court system); Peter F.
Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 223, 238-39
(confirming earlier findings, based on a study of a larger jurisdictional area). But see text
accompanying note 27 (explaining that the Leon Court reasoned that the small percentages in
empirical data actually masked large numbers of guilty defendants who are released because of
exclusion).
68. See LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(c) at 52 (cited in note 5); Wasserstrom and
Mertens, 22 Am. Crim.L. Rev. at 103 (cited in note 5).
69. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(c) at 53 (cited in note 5);
Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim.L. Rev. at 105 (cited in note 5).
70. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969),
established a two.pronged probable cause test. The Aguilar-Spinelli test required that an
affidavit reveal the informant's "basis of knowledge" and provide sufficient facts to establish
either the informant's veracity or reliability. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 412-13.
71. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
72. Professor LaFave argues that together Leon and Gatesproduce "a form of incomprehensible double counting." LaFave, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 924 (cited in note 5).
73. Leon, 468 U.S. at 940-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Justice Stewart explained:

928

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[47:917

Conversely, the Court discounted the rule's benefits by denying
that the exclusionary rule could deter magistrates. Mistakenly
focusing on the rule's role in deterring "the occasional ill-spirited
magistrate," the Court did not consider the rule's more general
role-to encourage magistrates to take their warrant-issuing function
seriously. 75 The rule deters magistrates by encouraging them to err in
favor of constitutional behavior. 76 Specifically, an appellate court's
suppression of evidence seized under an invalid warrant sends a
message to the issuing magistrate that her mistakes are of
consequence, and accordingly, she must review applications vigilantly.
The Court further minimized the benefits of the rule by narrowly construing the rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct.
According to the Court, the rule's deterrent effect operates only when
police knew or should have known that they were acting unconstitutionally. 77 By focusing exclusively on the rule's deterrent effect on
individual police officers, however, the Court ignored two other impor78
tant ways in which the exclusionary rule deters police misconduct.
First, through its general deterrent effect, the rule deters police
officers as a group. 79 Second, through its systemic deterrence function,
the exclusionary rule promotes institutional compliance with Fourth
Amendment requirements. For example, police departments may
develop training programs and guidelines to educate officers on how to
Much of the criticism levelled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is more properly
directed at the fourth amendment itself. ..
The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the police. The fourth
The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition against
amendment does.
unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer
criminals. That is not a political outcome impressed upon an unwilling citizenry by
unbelmighted judges. It is the price the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to
ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and property against unrestrained
governmental power.
Stewart, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1392-93 (cited in note 41).
See LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 55 (cited in note 5) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S.
75.
at 916) (explaining that the Court's statement that it had no evidence before it that magistrates
were 'inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment" revealed that it focused on
intentional noncompliance of issuing magistrates rather than noncompliance resulting from
carelessness).
76. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 55 (cited in note 5) (citing United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,561 (1982)).
77. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(d) at 57 (cited in note 5). See Leon, 468 U.S. at 91819 (rejecting the notion that the exclusionary rule could have any deterrent effect when police act
in an objectively reasonable manner).
78. Professors Mertens and Wasserstrom refer to the rule's effect on individual police
officers who have violated the Fourth Amendment and thus had evidence suppressed as its
special deterrent function. Mertens and Wasserstrom, 70 Georgetown L. J. at 394 (cited in note 4)
(identifying the three ways in which the exclusionary rule deters police misconduct).
79. Id.
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conduct legal searches and seizures.80 Therefore, the Leon Court
minimized the exclusionary rule's benefits by focusing exclusively on
the rule's special deterrent effect.
The numerous errors and oversights in the Court's cost-benefit
analysis suggest that the Leon Court manipulated its analysis to
reach a predetermined result. Indeed, two commentators accused the
Court of balancing these costs and benefits "with its thumb on the
scale.",, Two reasons explain why balancing the costs and benefits of
the exclusionary rule necessarily may involve the imposition of a
value judgment on the part of the Court. First, the costs and benefits
of the rule are not subject to precise empirical quantification.a2
Second, the Court's cost-benefit analysis attempts the impossible task
of weighing the defendant's privacy interest against society's interest
in the suppression of crime.s In any event, Leon clearly did not
contain a fair and honest assessment of the costs and benefits of
exclusion.84
C. The Unsettling Consequences of Leon

Ultimately, the Court's denial of the constitutional right to
exclusion and its faulty balancing analysis permitted it to recognize a
constitutional violation to which no sanction attaches.

5

Under Leon, a

search unsupported by probable cause but executed pursuant to a
facially valid warrant is legal. The Court thus failed to treat the
Leon thereby reduces Fourth
Fourth Amendment as law.m°
Amendment protection substantially.

80. Id. See also Leon, 468 U.S. at 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the rule's
chief deterrent function is to promote institutional compliance with the Fourth Amendment on
the part of law enforcement agencies).
81. Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 87 (cited in note 5).
82. Id. The benefits are even more difficult to quantify than the costs because they are
conjectural, essentially measuring non-events. Kamisar, 16 Creighton L. Rev. at 621 (cited in
note 4).
83. Kanilsar, 16 Creighton L. Rev. at 646-48 (cited in note 4).
84. As Justice Brennan observed, "Wie have not been treated to an honest assessment of
the merits of the exclusionary rule, but have instead been drawn into a curious world where the
'costs' of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the
'benefits' of such exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand." Leon, 468 U.S.
at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Dripps, 95 Yale L. J. at 907, 933-34 (cited in note 5). Justice Stevens declared: "Today,
for the first time, this Court holds that although the Constitution has been violated, no court
should do anything about it at any time and in any proceeding." Leon, 468 U.S. at 977 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). He noted that civil damages are not available in the cases in which the good faith
exception would apply. Id. at 977 n.35.
86. Dripps, 95 Yale L. J. at 933-34 (cited in note 5). The majority's disregard of the Fourth
Amendment's mandates was so glaring that it prompted Professor Dripps to declare, "I sincerely
doubt that the members of the Leon majority would have put the Fourth Amendment in the
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Leon, furthermore, threatens to erode the probable cause standard because it removes some of the incentives that the exclusionary
rule creates for police, magistrates, and police departments."' First, it
tells police that they only need obtain a warrant, not a warrant that
will necessarily stand up on review.s The good faith exception
thereby encourages police to spend less time establishing probable
cause and more time shopping for a sympathetic magistrate.
Second, it tells magistrates that their mistakes are of little
consequence because evidence seized under a defective warrant generally will be admissible under the good faith exception. 9 Leon thus
removes the rule as an incentive to encourage magistrates to be
vigilant in performing their warrant-issuing duties.90 Third, Leon
renders magistrates' decisions virtually unreviewable because
reviewing courts probably will determine the good faith issue before
reaching the underlying Fourth Amendment issue in the case.9 1
Accordingly, it diminishes the rule's role in guiding magistrates in
deciding close Fourth Amendment cases.92 Fourth, Leon places a premium on police ignorance of the law because evidence seized under an
invalid warrant generally will be admissible.9 3 Leon, therefore,
encourages police departments to train officers simply to rely on a
signed warrant rather than to scrutinize the magistrate's probable

Constitution. What after all is the point of a law whose observance is a 'cost' and whose violation
is 'objectively reasonable?'" Id. at 948.
87. Although one study conducted after Leon tentatively concluded that the short-term
effect of the decision was minimal, it emphasized that "[b]ecause of the constraints of the short
span of time since the Leon decision and the non-experimental design of the study, no
determination could be made of the lasting effects of the ruling." Craig D. Uchida, et al., Acting in
Good Faith: The Effects of United States v. Leon on the Police and the Courts, 30 Ariz. L. Rev.
467, 494 (1988). The study then predicted that "a more substantial impact may be observed in the
future." Id.
88. Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 109 (cited in note 5).
89. Leon, 468 U.S. at 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (predicting that "[inevitably, the care and attention devoted to such an inconsequential chore will dwindle").
91.
Although the majority asserted that "nothing will prevent reviewing courts from
deciding [the underlying Fourth Amendment] question before turning to the good.faith issue," id.
at 925, the dissenters stressed the unlikelihood of busy courts issuing these essentially advisory
opinions. Id. at 957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. See Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 112 (cited in note 5) (explaining
that although magistrates and police most need guidance from courts as to what constitutes
probable cause in close Fourth Amendment cases, these are precisely the cases that courts are
likely to dispose of without reaching the merits of the Fourth Amendment claims).
One commentator argues that Leon ultimately does less to effect an exception to the exclusionary rule than to replace a substantive definition of probable cause with a procedural one:
'[P]robable cause within bounds of plain error is whatever a magistrate says it is.' Dripps, 95 Yale
L. J. at 907 (cited in note 5).
93. Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cause determination independently. 94 As such, Leon destroyed some of
the rule's institutional incentives. 9
The most unsettling consequence of Leon is its effect on the
future of the exclusionary rule.96 Although the Court made it appear
that it only slightly restricted the exclusionary rule, similar to
decisions in Stone v. Powell,97 United States v. Calandra,98 and United
States v. Janis9 in fact, it took a much larger leap. 10° The Court in
those earlier cases whittled away at the exclusionary rule in proceedings collateral to the criminal prosecution itself, whereas the Leon
Court concluded for the first time that the costs of the exclusionary
rule outweighed its benefits in the prosecution's case-in-chief.ol Leon
thus opened the door to further incursions on the exclusionary rule.
IV. THE PROPER GROUNDS FOR STATE COURT DIVERGENCE FROM
FEDERAL LAW

Leon provides state courts with several compelling reasons to
reject the good faith exception. State courts may challenge Leon because it: (1) denied the constitutional foundations of the exclusionary
rule, (2) rested on an incorrect assessment of the costs and benefits of
exclusion, and (3) substantially reduced Fourth Amendment
protection. The central question for courts, therefore, is determining
the proper grounds for divergence from federal law. Is disagreement
with Supreme Court reasoning and result sufficient to justify

94.

Id.

95. For a discussion of the institutional incentives the exclusionary rule creates, see note 80
and accompanying text (discussing the rule's systemic deterrence function).
96. See Duke, 95 Yale. L. J. at 1422 (cited in note 5); LaFave, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 930
(cited in note 5) (predicting that the temptation will be great to extend the good faith exception to
without-warrant cases); Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note 5)
(referring to the bleak future of the exclusionary rule after Leon).
97. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
98. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
99. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
100. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(b) at 50 (cited in note 5).
101. Wasserstrom and Mertens, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 90 (cited in note 5); LaFave, 1
Search and Seizure § 1.3(b) at 50-51 (cited in note 5).
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divergence? 02 New federalism commentators have grappled with this
question since the movement's beginnings. 1°3
Two decades after the exclusionary rule's inception, commentators have reached an "overwhelming consensus"1°4 that reactive
rulings-those based merely on disagreement with Supreme Court
reasoning and result-are inappropriate. 01 5 Most commentators,
including dissenters in reactive decisions,' ° ^ simply assume that these
decisions are inherently unprincipled or illegitimate.107 Others argue
that courts employing reactive decisionmaking do not accord proper
respect to the Supreme Court, 08 assume the legislative function,'"

102. This question is one of propriety, not right. Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New
Federalism, Toward a PrincipledInterpretationof the State Constitution,29 Stan. L. Rev. 297,
298 (1977). State courts clearly have the right to interpret their state constitutions independently
provided they do not violate Supreme Court interpretations of federal law. See note 6.
103. New federalism developed in the mid-1970s in response to the conservatism of the
Burger Court. Gardner, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 771 (cited in note 8). See generally William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489
(1977) (urging state courts to "step into the breach" left by the Supreme Court's retreat from its
role as the guardian of individual rights). As the seminal work of the new federalism movement,
commentators have referred to Brennan's article as the 'Magna Carta of state constitutionalism."
Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as SeparateSources of FundamentalRights, 35 Rutgers
L. Rev. 707, 716 (1983). Because dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's results essentially
birthed the new federalism movement, much of the debate naturally focused on the question of
whether this dissatisfaction, by itself, justified divergence from federal law.
104. Gardner, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 772 (cited in note 8).
105. See, for example, Ronald K.L. Collins, Relevance on State Constitutions-Away from a
ReactionaryApproach, 9 Hastings Cost. L. Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); George Deulmejian and Clifford K.
Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6
Hastings Const. L. Q. 975, 988-89 (1979); Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial
Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 731, 779, 786 (1982); A.E. Dick
Howard, The Renaissanceof State ConstitutionalLaw, 1 Emerging Issues in St. Const. L. 1, 12-13
(1988); Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial
Restraint,63 Denver U. L. Rev. 85, 95 (1985); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalismin Practice
and Principle, 61 St. John's L. Rev. 399, 418 (1987); Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 300 (cited
in note 102).
106. For examples of cases in which dissenters have leveled this criticism at the majority
opinion, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1177 (1985); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme
Court'sShadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme CourtReasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L.
Rev. 353, 357-58 n.18 (1984); Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 297 n.7 (cited in note 102).
107. See, for example, Deukmejian and Thompson, 6 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 988-89 (cited in
note 105); Kaye, 61 St. John's L. Rev. at 418 (cited in note 105); Howard, 1 Emerging Issues in St.
Const. L. at 13 (cited in note 105); Hudnut, 63 Denver U. L. Rev. at 95 (cited in note 105);
Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 297, 300, 318 (cited in note 102).
108. Hudnut, 63 Denver U. L. Rev. at 95 (cited in note 105).
109. Deukmejian and Thompson, 6 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 999-1006 (cited in note 105).
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undermine the judicial process, 110 degrade the state constitution,' and
fail to produce a coherent corpus of state constitutional law.,12
In response to the widespread condemnation of reactive
rulings, state court judges" 3 and commentators have formulated criteria to justify state court divergence from federal law. 114 Although the
lists vary slightly, they generally include the following: (1) textual
difference in the state and federal constitutions, (2) differing legislative history, (3) state law precedents predating the Supreme Court
decision, and (4) distinctive qualities of the state or its citizenry. 115 In
developing these criteria, state court judges and commentators have6
produced what has been termed the doctrine of unique state sources."
Under this doctrine, divergence is justified only when one of the statespecific factors" 7 supports a different outcome. The doctrine of unique
110.

Id. at 1006-09.
111. Collins, 9 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 14 (cited in note 105) (arguing that reactive
decisionmaking reduces the state constitution to a "plaything").
112. Id. at 16 (asserting that the reactive approach "produces a handful of state
constitutional decisions that are no more than aberrations, linked neither in logic nor precedent
to any sustaining corpus of state law").
113. Justice Handler's concurring opinion in New Jersey's State v. Hunt provides an
excellent example of criterion justification. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67
(1982) (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler listed seven criteria that would justify reaching
a different result than the Supreme Court had reached: (1) a textual difference between the state
and federal provisions, (2) legislative history of the provision indicating that the state legislature
meant to afford greater protection under the state provision than Congress gave under its federal
counterpart, (3) state decisions predating the Supreme Court decision, (4) differences in state and
federal structure, (5) matters of particular state or local interest, (6) state history or traditions,
and (7) distinctive public attitudes in the state. Id. In contrast, Justice Pashnman, in his
concurrence, argued that a state court should not hesitate to reject a Supreme Court opinion even
if no state.specific factors support divergence. See id. at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring) (asserting
that "[w]hen this Court considers that important constitutional rights are inadequately protected
by the federal constitution, we have an obligation under the State Constitution to supply that
protection"). See also State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199, 1217 (1980) (Horowitz,
J., dissenting).
114. See, for example, Deukmejian and Thompson, 6 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 987-96 (cited in
note 105); Galie, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. at 733 (cited in note 105); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts
and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873, 933-34 (1976);
Hudnut, 63 Denver U. L. Rev. at 103-07 (cited in note 105); Kaye, 61 St. John's L. Rev. at 420
(cited in note 105); Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 318-19 (cited in note 102). See also Ronald
K. L. Collins, Foreword: The Once "New JudicialFederalism"& Its Critics,64 Wash. L. Rev. 5, 67, 10 (1989) (discussing the commentators' insistence on neutral criteria to justify state court
divergence from a Supreme Court case); Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State
ConstitutionalRights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324, 1360-62 (1982) (explaining that state-specific factors
provide one ground for divergence from federal law); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority
in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1147, 1147, 1152-53 (1993) (asserting that a
"doctrine of unique state sources" has developed); Williams, 35 S.C. L. Rev. at 355-59, 385-89
(cited in note 106) (discussing the trend among state court judges and commentators to formulate
criteria to justify state court divergence from the federal result).
115. Collins, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 10 (cited in note 114) (stressing that analytical soundness is
the missing criterion).
116. Kahn, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 1147, 1152 (citedin note 114).
117. 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1361 (cited in note 114).
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state sources implies that a state-specific factor supporting divergence
somehow legitimates a state court decision and ensures that it is principled.
V. THE STATES' REJECTIONS OF LEoN

Five of the eight state supreme courts that have rejected Leon
on state constitutional grounds have done so purely on the basis of
their dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's reasoning and result.
Although some courts have offered more detailed discussions of the
Leon exception than others, their decisions are all reactive. In
contrast, the remaining three state supreme court decisions that
rejected Leon relied on state-specific factors to justify their divergence
from the Supreme Court result.
In its 1985 decision, People v. Bigelow, the New York Court of
Appeals became the first state supreme court to decline to adopt the
Leon good faith exception under its state constitution." 8 The Bigelow
court summarily rejected Leon, asserting that the good faith exception
frustrates the exclusionary rule's purpose, places a premium on police
illegality, and creates an incentive for future unlawful police
conduct. 119
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court offered a more thorough analysis of the good faith exception than the New York court did,
its rejection of Leon in State v. Novembrino120 was likewise reactive.
Ultimately, the Novembrino court based its rejection of Leon on the
unavoidable tension it perceived between the good faith exception and
the New Jersey Constitution's guarantee that search warrants "shall
not issue except upon probable cause."121 The court further indicated
that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally mandated in New
Jersey,122 but it offered no case law supporting this proposition.
Therefore, this assertion does not help Novembrino to escape the
reactive label.
Similarly, the Connecticut and Vermont courts relied exclusively on criticisms of Leon to reject the good faith exception under
23 the Connecticut court
their state constitutions. In State v. Marsala,1
thoroughly and persuasively attacked both the Leon Court's cost118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451 (1985).
Id. at 458.
105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856-57 n.39.
216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58 (1990).
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benefit analysis 2 4 and the effects of its decision, 25 holding that the
Connecticut Constitution does not recognize the good faith
exception. 12 6 In State v. Oakes,127 the Vermont Supreme Court
discussed the many flaws in the Leon Court's cost-benefit analysis,
emphasizing that sufficient empirical data does not exist to assess the
costs and benefits of the good faith exception accurately. 2 , The court
then declined to subject its state exclusionary rule to the "uncertain
12 9
effects" of the good faith exception.
Most recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to
adopt the Leon exception under its state constitution in State v.
Gutierrez.130 Like the New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Vermont courts, the New Mexico court did not rely on a state-specific
factor to reject Leon. Nonetheless, the New Mexico court apparently
did attempt to find a state-specific factor to support its divergence
from federal law. The Gutierrez court examined its state search and
seizure jurisprudence, but concluded that it begrudgingly accepted the
federal exclusionary rule and did not analyze the state provision
proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures independently. 3' In
addition, it reviewed the history of its search and seizure provision but
concluded that the history was unclear.132 Although the New Mexico
court found no state-specific factor supporting divergence, it ultimately rejected Leon. 33 The court explained that the basis articulated
for its state exclusionary rule-to effectuate the constitutional right in
the case at bar34-was incompatible with the good faith exception. 35
In contrast to Bigelow, Novembrino, Marsala, Oakes, and
Gutierrez, in State v. Carter, 36 the North Carolina court relied on a
state-specific factor to reject Leon. The Cartercourt based its rejection
of the Leon exception on the state's public policy to exclude evidence
124. Id. at 64-67.
125. Id. at 68.
126. Id.
127. 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d 119 (1991).
128. Id. at 122-26.
129. Id. at 127.
130. 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993).
131. Id. at 1061. The court cited the one instance in which it had diverged from federal
search and seizure jurisprudence in State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989), in which
the New Mexico court rejected Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1989). Gutierrez,863 P.2d at 1061.
132. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1064.
133. Id. at 1067.
134. Id. at 1066, 1067. By defining the basis of the state exclusionary rule in this way, the
New Mexico court candidly acknowledged that it broke with its own precedent. See id. at 1061
(explaining that it followed the Supreme Court in adopting the deterrence rationale for the

exclusionary rule in State v. Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286, 657 P.2d 613 (1982)).
135. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1068.
136. 322 N.C. 709,370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
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obtained in violation of its constitution's search and seizure provision.
According to the court, the state statute that codified the exclusionary
rule expressed this policy.' 3 The North Carolina court reasoned that
the legislature should be responsible for creating a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule statute.1 38 In basing its decision on
public policy as revealed by a state statute, the North Carolina court
apparently relied on a distinctive state quality to justify divergence.13 9
Therefore, Carter escapes the reactive label.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Edmunds'4° also relied on a state-specific factor to support its rejection
of Leon.'14 It explained that the Pennsylvania Constitution's search
and seizure provision, adopted prior to the Fourth Amendment,'4
embodies a strong right of privacy, as case law construing the
provision indicated.'4
Accordingly, the court asserted that the
purpose behind its state exclusionary rule is to protect the right to
privacy of Pennsylvania's citizens rather than to deter police
misconduct. 44 The court concluded that the good faith exception
would emasculate the strong right of privacy inherent in the state
search and seizure provision as well as its probable cause
requirement.

145

Like the Pennsylvania court, the Idaho court in State v.
Guzman'46 identified state precedent that supported divergence from
Leon. Specifically, it explained that its state exclusionary rule is
4 and that the purposes underlying it are
constitutionally mandated '1

137. Id. at 559,562.
138. Id. at 562.
139. A distinctive state quality is one of the state-specific factors that justifies divergence
under the doctrine of unique state sources. See notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
140. 526 Pa. 374,586 A.2d 887 (1991).
141. Before turning to the issue of whether it would adopt the good faith exception under its
state constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a four-step methodology to
analyze state constitutional issues. It enumerated four factors that it would consider in deciding
state constitutional issues: (1) the text of the provision; (2) the history of the provision, including
state case law; (3) related case law from other states; and (4) policy considerations, including
matters of unique state and local concern. Id. at 895. Edmunds thus underscores the trend
among state courts to develop criteria that justify divergence from a Supreme Court decision.
142. Id. at 896.
143. Id. at 897.
144. Id. But see id. at 907-08 (McDermott, J., dissenting) (asserting that the state exclusionary rule's purpose always had been to deter police misconduct and criticizing the majority's
misuse of precedent); Note, Pennsylvania Refuses to Take the Leon Leap of Good
Faith-Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A2d 887 (Pa. 1991), 65 Temple L. Rev. 733, 746-50
(1992) (discussing the majority's break with precedent).
145. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899.
146. 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).
147. Id. at 671.
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broader than those behind the federal rule.' 48 According to the court,
the Idaho exclusionary rule is meant to: (1) provide an effective
remedy for violations of its search and seizure provision, (2) encourage
thoroughness in the warrant-issuing process, (3) prevent the judiciary
from committing a second violation of the search and seizure provision
by admitting illegally seized evidence, (4) preserve judicial integrity,
and (5) deter police misconduct. 49 Because it concluded that the good
faith exception was incompatible with the multiple purposes behind
its state exclusionary rule, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Leon.15°
VI. A DEFENSE OF THE REACTIVE RULINGS
The majority of state court decisions that reject Leon are
reactive because they are based solely on dissatisfaction with the
Supreme Court's reasoning and result rather than state-specific factors. According to the "overwhelming consensus" 15 ' among new
federalism commentators, these decisions are inherently unprincipled
and illegitimate. The commentators' denunciation of reactive rulings
and the resulting doctrine of unique state sources, however, rest on
fundamentally flawed premises.
The new federalists' condemnation of reactive rulings is unjustified because it is based on a presumption of correctness accorded
to Supreme Court decisions.52 Although few of the commentators
make this presumption explicit,15 it clearly is present in their writ-

148. Id.

149. Id. at 672.
150. Id. at 671-72.
151. Gardner, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 772 (cited in note 8).
152. As one commentator explained, 'The Supreme Court decision casts a shadow over
subsequent state litigation on what otherwise would be purely a question of state constitutional
interpretation. The shadow seems to create a presumption of correctness, thus requiring a state
court clearly to articulate reasons justifying a contrary result." Williams, 35 S.C. L. Rev. at 356
(cited in note 106). See Collins, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 6-8 (cited in note 114) (asserting that the new
federalism critics assume that federal law is the 'analytical yardstick by which to determine the
legitimacy of state law decisions" and that state decisions that diverge are seen as 'presumptively
(if not conclusively) suspect"); George E. Dix, Exclusionary Rule Issues as Matters of State Law,
11 Am. J. Crim. L. 109, 124-25 (1983) (observing the tendency to view Supreme Court decisions as
presumptively appropriate in state constitutional analysis); Maurice Kelman, Foreward:
Rediscovering the State ConstitutionalBill of Rights, 27 Wayne L. Rev. 413, 421, 431-32 (1981)
(describing the analogous pressure or influence of Supreme Court decisions on state courts that
leads the courts to view Supreme Court analyses and results as presumptively appropriate). See
also Dix, 11 Am. J. Crim. L. at 124-25 n.60 (asserting that the Supreme Court formally recognized
the pressure its decisions exerted on state courts in Michiganv. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)).
153. But see Hudnut, 63 Denver U. L. Rev. at 95 (cited in note 105) (arguing that reactive
decisions "signala a lack of respect by state court judges for precedent and the United States
Supreme Court").
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ings. Otherwise, the commentators would not suggest that additional
justification beyond dissatisfaction with federal constitutional holdings is necessary for state court rejection of a Supreme Court decision.
According a Supreme Court decision a presumption of correctness in
the context of state constitutional litigation is incorrect for three
reasons.
First, the presumption of correctness is not based on the
soundness of the Court's reasoning but on its institutional position as
the highest court in the land.154 Accordingly, this approach places a
premium on the institutional aspect of constitutional interpretation at
the expense of independent state interpretation. Therefore, the presumption accords Supreme Court decisions too much deference in the
context of state constitutional decisionmaking. 155 Furthermore, although the presumption arguably rests on the desirability of uniformity between federal and state law,1' uniformity is not clearly of suffi5 7
cient importance to support the presumption argument.1
Particularly in the exclusionary rule context, precedent suggests that
uniformity between the state and federal levels is not essential, as the
New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Novembrino.1 In short, neither
the Court's institutional position nor the uniformity concern justify
the presumption.
Second, the presumption disregards the different institutional
positions of state and federal courts. Supreme Court decisions are not
presumptively appropriate guides for state courts because of the
institutional limitations inherent in Supreme Court federal
constitutional rulings. 59 Supreme Court decisions, at least those
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, must operate across the
nation; therefore, they invariably represent the "lowest common

154. Williams, 35 S.C. L. Rev. at 356 (cited in note 106).
155. Id. at 388.
156. See Dix, 11 Am. J. Crim. L. at 125 (cited in note 152) (explaining that the presumption
of appropriateness of Supreme Court decisions apparently rests on the uniformity concern). See
also Hudnut, 63 Denver U. L. Rev. at 90-93 (cited in note 105) (asserting that state court divergence from federal constitutional precedent creates a lack of uniformity, among other problems,
and presenting arguments in favor of uniformity). But see Collins, 64 Wash. L. Rev. at 15 (cited in
note 114) (arguing that our dual constitutional system, not state court divergence from federal
law, creates the uniformity problems).
157. Dix, 11 Am. J. Crim. L. at 125 (cited in note 152).
158. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 855 (1987) (citing Wolf v. Colorado,338
U.S. 25, 28-33 (1949)).
159. Williams, 35 S.C. L. Rev. at 389 (cited in note 106). For a discussion of the institutional
limitations on Supreme Court federal constitutional decisions, see generally Lawrence Gene
Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 Harv. L. Rev.
1212 (1978); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1985).
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denominator."'160 Thus, federalism concerns restrain the Court's
constitutional analysis.161 In fact, the resulting underenforcement of
federal constitutional guarantees by the Supreme Court has been
Because these institutional limitations do not
documented.162
constrain state courts, however, one should not view Supreme Court
decisions as presumptively 163 correct in the context of state
constitutional decisionmaking.
Third, and most significant, the presumption of correctness
accorded Supreme Court decisions misconstrues the essence of
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is not a set of truths but an
interpretive enterprise.164 Interpretations of broad, open-ended constitutional rights are neither presumptively correct nor presumptively
incorrect. 65 At least to the extent that a Supreme Court decision rests
on factual assumptions with which reasonable persons could differ,166
67
it is not entitled to a presumption of correctness.
Likewise, the doctrine of unique state sources rests on a mistaken assumption. As Professor Paul Kahn has argued persuasively,
the doctrine of unique state sources assumes that people of a state
have a unique political identity revealed through the text and history
of the state constitution. 68 That any meaningful state identity exists

160. Williams, 35 S.C. L. Rev. at 389 (cited in note 106) (quoting Alderwood Assocs. v.
WashingtonEnvir. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230,635 P.2d 108, 115 (1981)).
161. See Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. at 1217-18 (cited in note 159).
Professor Sager
distinguishes between institutional and analytical limitations on the Supreme Court's
constitutional rulings. The institutional limitations derive from the position of the Court in the
governing structure while analytical limitations are intrinsic to the particular clause that the
Court is interpreting. Sager refers to federalism as an institutional, rather than an analytical,
limitation. Id.
162. Id. at 1218-20.
163. See id. at 1221 (arguing that because of state courts' different institutional position,
they should be free to expand federal constitutional rights to their analytic limits).
164. "[C]onstitutionalism is not a single set of truths, but an ongoing debate about the
meaning of the rule of law in a democratic political order." Kahn, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 1147-48
(cited in note 114). See also id. at 1156-59.
165. See 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1396 (cited in note 114) (stating that '[a]cross jurisdictions,
alternative interpretations of an open-ended right cannot be considered illegitimate'); Williams,
35 S.C. L. Rev. at 402 (cited in note 106) (stating that 'Ithe Supreme Court does not have a
monopoly on correct constitutional interpretation").
166. Leon contains many of these assumptions: (1) the exclusionary rule is a remedy, not a
constitutional right; (2) the exclusionary rule does not deter issuing magistrates; (3) the rule can
have no deterrent effect on police officers when they act in an objectively reasonable manner. See
generally notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
167. Dix, 11 Am. J. Crim. L. at 125-26 (cited in note 152).
168. Kahn asserts, "To rest state constitutionalism on an idea of the state as an alreadydefined historical community, with a text that can be interpreted to reflect the unique political
identity of members of that community, is to try to build a serious legal doctrine on what may be
no more than an anachronism or romantic myth." Kahn, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 1160 (cited in note
114).
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today, however, is doubtful.169 As such, the doctrine of unique state
sources rests on an anachronistic ideal. Moreover, the text and
history of a state constitution likely do not reflect the unique, evolving
political identity of the state's citizens. 170 Professor Kahn therefore
rejects the doctrine of unique state sources. He argues that state
courts must be free to draw on a wide range of factors to develop their
best interpretations of state constitutional values. 171
The commentators' categorical rejection of reactive decisions
and the resulting doctrine of unique state sources are both ultimately
unpersuasive. Thus, no reason exists to consider reactive decisions
less principled or legitimate than those decisions that base their
rejections of a Supreme Court decision on a state-specific factor.

VII. CONCLUSION
Reactive rulings are not inherently illegitimate or unprincipled;

therefore, state courts should feel compelled to follow Supreme Court
precedent only to the extent that they find it persuasive. Although
state-specific factors can serve as guides in state constitutional decisionmaking, they must not serve as necessary conditions for diver-

gence.'7 2 If a state court allows the doctrine of unique state sources to
serve as a limitation on its authority to disagree with a Supreme
Court result, it effectively abdicates its obligation to interpret its state

constitution.' 73 Because the Supreme Court's reasoning and result in

169. Id. See also Gardner, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 828 (cited in note 8) (discussing the "collapse
of meaningful state identity").
170. Kahn explains, "Substantively, it would be remarkable if the authors of each of these
state sources . . . had resolved and codified distinct answers to our common constitutional
problems. Even if they had, given the mobility and changing character of today's citizens, there is
no reason to believe that there is a substantial coherence between the actual community's values
and those sources." Kahn, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 1160-61 (cited in note 114) (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. at 1161.
172. Williams, 35 S.C. L. Rev. at 402 (cited in note 106).
173. See Catherine Hancock, State CourtActivism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 Va. L.
Rev. 1085, 1126 n.138 (1982) (arguing that limiting state court independent interpretations of
their state constitutions to situations in which a textual difference exists between the federal and
state provisions "is to deny state courts the fundamental power to interpret their constitutions as
they see fit"). As the Vermont Supreme Court remarked in State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d
119 (1991), the Leon Court's assessment of the costs and benefits of exclusion "can inform this
Court's decision on the good faith exception only to the extent that it is persuasive. If the
assessment is flawed, this Court cannot simply accept the conclusion the Supreme Court draws
from it. To do so would be contrary to our obligation to ensure that our state exclusionary rule effectuates Article 11 rights, and would disserve those rights." Id. at 122.
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Leon are unpersuasive, state courts should continue to reject Leon on
state constitutional grounds, even if no state-specific factor supports
divergence.
Leigh A. Morrissey

